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Abstract
The present paper gives a philosophical analysis of the conceptual variation in the
homology concept. It is argued that different homology concepts are used in evolution-
ary and comparative biology, in evolutionary developmental biology, and in molecular
biology. The study uses conceptual role semantics, focusing on the inferences and expla-
nations supported by concepts, as a heuristic tool to explain conceptual change. The
differences between homology concepts are due to the fact that these concepts play
different theoretical roles for different biological fields. The specific theoretical needs
and explanatory interests of different research approaches lead to different homology
concepts.
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1. Introduction. Homology is a crucial biological concept; in fact, some consider
it one of the most important concepts in all of biology (Donoghue 1992; Wake 1994;
Raff 1996; Abouheif et al. 1997; Laubichler 2000). Homology refers to structures and
characters in different species that correspond to each other. Despite its importance
for biology, the homology concept has not been extensively discussed by philosophers
of science. The homology concept has a long and rich history, dating back more than
200 years. While this term was originally used mainly in comparative and later in
evolutionary biology, it has recently become important for developmental and molecular
biology. In the last decades several aspects and several levels of homology emerged and
became relevant for some fields (e.g., serial homology, molecular homology). Nowadays
the term ‘homology’ exhibits noticeable variation within the biological community.
Different biological fields have a different perspective on homology. In fact, several
so-called ‘concepts’ or ‘definitions’ of homology are proposed, criticized and defended.
The term ‘homology’, as it seems, is used with a different content in different parts of
the biological community. The aim of the present paper is to analyze this conceptual
variation and to offer a philosophical account of it.
As will be argued, there are three different homology concepts used in contem-
porary biology. These different concepts correspond to three fields within biology—
comparative and evolutionary biology, evolutionary developmental biology, and molec-
ular biology. Using conceptual role semantics as a heuristic tool for the study of differ-
ences among scientific concepts, my claim is that these conceptual differences are due to
the fact that homology plays a different theoretical role for different fields, i.e., homol-
ogy concepts are used for different concrete epistemic goals. The following discussion
will make clear that the homology concepts that are characteristic of the three commu-
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nities are embedded in three different approaches and are employed in characteristically
different inferences and explanations.
2. A conceptual role approach to conceptual change in science. For the study
of conceptual change, it is important to recognize that concepts stand in historical
relationships. Concepts form lineages so that a recent concept may stem from a for-
mer concept. The different current homology concepts are derived from an original
homology concept. This concept migrated into new disciplines and underwent adaptive
radiation— leading to different specialized homology concepts. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to give an account of the rich history of homology and the actual origin
and emergence of the three current homology concepts. In particular, I will not discuss
whether there actually existed one or more homology concepts in the past (such as
a pre-Darwinian and a distinct post-Darwinian concept as forerunners of the current
concepts); and I will not asses whether one of the current concepts is in fact the same
concept (i.e., has the same content) as one of the historical concepts. Instead, the focus
of my analysis will be on the recent situation and the burden of the argument is that
currently there coexist three distinct homology concepts. Thus the present discussion
is about the current conceptual variation rather than a detailed study of conceptual
change.1
Given that a discussion of the history of the current homology concepts is beyond
the scope of the present discussion, the following remarks will suffice to introduce the
very idea of homology and point to the basic root of the current concepts. Homology
is what I call an investigative kind concept. An investigative kind is a group of entities
that are presumed to belong together due to some underlying mechanism or a struc-
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tural property. The idea that these entities belong to a kind might be due to some
interesting similarities: scientists perceive a certain pattern in nature. However, these
similarities are not deemed to be what characterizes this kind. Instead, an investigative
kind is specified by some theoretically important, but yet unknown underlying feature
or process that is presumed to account for the observed similarities. Thus an investiga-
tive kind concept is associated with a search for the basis of the kind. An example is
the species concept. We are able to recognize species, but it is not immediately clear
what accounts for the origin and coherence of these units— leading to different species
definitions. A full theoretical account of an investigative kind can only be given after
appropriate empirical study and might reveal a variety of complications. An investiga-
tive kind concept may even change its reference throughout scientific investigation. In
any case, an investigative kind concept goes together with a scientific search which may
be open-ended.2
The homology concept is an investigative kind concept for the following reasons:
Biologists perceived and perceive a unity of form among different taxa. Structures in
organisms from different species seem to correspond to each other. Phyla are taxa which
encompass those animals that have a common body plan. This allows scientists to place
the morphological structures of different species in correspondence (e.g., according to
their relative position in the body plan). For instance, the human arm and the bat
wing are homologous because the individual bones of the human arm correspond to
the bones of the bat wing. Homology refers to this correspondence: corresponding
structures in different organisms are called ‘homologues’ or said to be ‘homologous
to each other’. Homologues often have the same name, even across distantly related
species. The definition of Richard Owen, which is still favored by some contemporary
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biologists, expresses this fact:
HOMOLOGUE . . . The same organ in different animals under every variety of
form and function. (Owen 1843, p. 379)
Biologist are able to recognize homologous structures, and there are accepted criteria of
homology. However, the perceived structural similarity is not to be confused with the
nature of the correspondence called homology. (Owen’s definition distinguishes between
“sameness” and superficial shape or “form”, that varies between species.) Considering
homology an investigative kind concept means that there is a search for the biological
basis of homology. An account is needed of what characterizes the structures that are
(considered) homologous, i.e., an explanation of the perceived phenomenon picked out
by examples and by the accepted criteria of homology. Different theoretical perspec-
tives lead to different historical and contemporary accounts of homology. A few 19th
century idealistic morphologists explained the unity of form with reference to Platonic
ideas. Structures were viewed as homologous in case they were (empirical and im-
perfect) instantiations of the same abstract and perfect pattern. With the advent of
Darwinism, a common evolutionary origin became the standard explanation of homol-
ogous correspondence of structures. In fact, homologues are often defined as structures
that are derived from a common ancestor. For contemporary developmental approaches
to homology, however, reference to inheritance from a common ancestor cannot be a
complete explanation because it does not give a causal-mechanistic explanation of how
the same structures develop repeatedly in different generations.
The investigative kind concept account of homology points to the historical root of
the homology concept. In addition, it explains why there can be different accounts of
homology, even though different fields of biology use the same criteria of homology and
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consider largely the same structures as homologous. Often, biologists just speak about
the homology concept. This is due to the common historical root, accepted criteria and
instances of homology, and the general idea that homology refers to the corresponding
structures in different organisms. Nevertheless, there is conceptual variation in the cur-
rent term ‘homology’, which is actually so large that we can identify several homology
concepts. In order to be able to argue for this, we need an account of the content and
the individuation of concepts. The idea that concepts form historical lineages presumes
that we have an account of what defines a split of a lineage, creating novel concepts. To
be able to track conceptual change, we need a theory of what a change in the content
of a concept is and whether it amounts to a new concept. In addition, an account of
the content of concepts is the basis for explaining why an instance of conceptual change
occurred and for assessing whether it was progressive.
Most discussions in the philosophy of science about conceptual change have focused
on the reference of terms (Newton-Smith 1981; Hacking 1983; Psillos 1999). The focus
on reference often stems from the attempt to show that theoretical change does not lead
to semantic incommensurability. Philosophers point out that substantial theoretical
change need not lead to reference change among the fundamental terms of the theory, so
that both theories address the same entities and thus can be compared (Scheffler 1967;
Devitt 1979; Sankey 1994). However, such a framework is of limited use for the study
of conceptual change because a conceptual lineage may split into distinct concepts with
referential continuity (as it is the case with some contemporary species concepts) and
conceptual change and progress within a lineage may occur without change of reference.
For example, take the term ‘gene’. The molecular gene concept refers to the same
entities as its predecessor, the Mendelian gene concept. However, the molecular gene
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concept is a much more powerful concept in that it supports explanations in molecular
and developmental biology which the Mendelian gene concept did not support.
Kitcher (1978, 1993) offers a framework that does not just study reference. His core
notion is that of the ‘reference potential’ of a term, which is the set of the different ways
scientists refer to a category. For Kitcher, conceptual change is change of reference
potential, and conceptual progress occurs if we acquire new ways of referring to a
category. However, we need a better account of why the molecular gene concept is more
powerful than pointing out that we nowadays have more ways to refer to this entity. A
theory of concepts has to capture the way in which concepts facilitate explanations and
discovery, so that we can view the transition from Mendelian to molecular genetics as
an instance of explanatory progress because of the change of the gene concept. Kitcher
(1993), however, does not connect the issue of conceptual progress to his discussion of
explanatory progress. In addition, Kitcher does not intend to explain why conceptual
change occurred, which I view as an important task for a theory of conceptual change. It
may be possible to develop Kitcher’s framework to include these issues. But this would
mean to first have an account of reference, then develop a notion of reference potential,
and in a third stage try to address the issues that are at the core of understanding
conceptual change. My strategy instead is to focus from the very beginning on those
aspects of concepts that allow for a more direct explanation and evaluation of conceptual
change.
Concepts are knowledge producers, and scientists use concepts to justify claims and
give explanations of phenomena. By supporting inferences and explanations concepts
help to create specific kinds of scientific knowledge. This knowledge is an epistemic
product of scientific reasoning, and obtaining certain kinds of knowledge may be char-
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acteristic for a particular branch of science. Different scientific fields and research
approaches have different theoretical goals, and thus demand different epistemic prod-
ucts. Concepts are employed to pursue these goals; in fact, concepts are shaped and
designed to bring about the intended epistemic product. Thus, my approach is to link
concepts to the epistemic products and the theoretical goals of a scientific field. My
focus is on the inferences and explanations that are supported by a particular concept,
which yield the kinds of knowledge that a specific field needs. Conceptual change and
possible conceptual differences have to be detected by examining the inferential and
explanatory potential of concepts. I will argue that the different homology concepts
actually support different types of inferences and explanations. And these inferences
and explanations are specific and important for the field in which a particular homol-
ogy concept is used. Thus, my framework attempts to explain conceptual change by
reference to the goals of a field; and conceptual progress can be evaluated based on
whether a particular concept is actually able to provide kinds of knowledge and expla-
nations that are scientifically significant. The molecular gene concept, for instance, is
an advance because it supports molecular explanations that could not have been given
using the Mendelian gene concept.
My focus on the inferences and explanations supported by a scientific concept fits
with a general approach to conceptual content— conceptual role semantics, which I will
use as an account of concepts and concept individuation. Conceptual role semantics is
not a particular theory, rather it is a broad framework that encompasses various (some-
times very different) semantic approaches (compare Field 1977; Block 1986; Harman
1987; Brandom 1994; Wedgwood 2001). The idea of conceptual role semantics—also
called functional role or inferential role semantics— is that the content of syntactic
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entities and mental representations is at least partially constituted by the cognitive or
inferential role they have for a thinker or community. Concepts have a specific role in
thought, perception, decision making, and action. Conceptual role semantics has been
advanced as an account of mental and semantic content. However, I am not concerned
with general issues from the philosophy of mind and language, but only with concepts
and conceptual change in science. I use conceptual role semantics as a heuristic tool to
detect and explain conceptual differences.
There are several ideas about what a conceptual role is. As the present discussion
deals with scientific concepts, I focus on the role concepts play in theoretical reasoning.
Theoretical reasoning does not presuppose that there is an explicitly formulated theory.
The molecular homology concept has a theoretical role independent of whether there
is something like a ‘theory of molecular biology’. One important aspect of the theo-
retical role of concepts is their inferential role. By virtue of its content, a concept has
inferential connections to other concepts. If two concepts support two classes of infer-
ences that are different, then they have a different inferential role.3 The inferences that
scientific concepts make possible are important for producing scientific knowledge and
justifying scientific claims. While philosophical accounts along the line of conceptual
role semantics have stressed the inferential potential of concepts, one needs to keep in
mind that concepts— in particular scientific concepts—are also used for explanations.
Propositions containing a concept can explain certain facts. A particular concept might
be crucial for explaining a specific class of processes or situations, while in order to ac-
count for another class of phenomena a different concept needs to be employed. It is
not obvious how explanation relates to standard models of inference making. Salmon
(1970) argues that explanations are not arguments (neither inductive nor deductive),
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so the inferential role of concepts need not encompass their explanatory role. In the
case of statistical explanations, concepts may pick out a class and appropriate reference
classes and link them to statistical relevance relations. In causal explanations a concept
picks out a set of entities that are part of similar causal processes or governed by the
same causal law. My case study will argue that a crucial difference between the ho-
mology concept used in evolutionary developmental biology and the homology concept
of evolutionary and comparative biology is their difference in explanatory potential. In
fact, evolutionary developmental biology uses its particular homology concept because
other homology concepts cannot yield the type of explanations that are important for
developmental biology.4
Even though I use a conceptual role semantics, I do not identify concepts (or con-
ceptual content) with conceptual role. For this would lead to holism about concept
individuation; any difference in inferential role would amount to a new concept, so that
every scientist might have a different concept. Instead, I assume that the content of
terms supervenes on conceptual roles. In particular, two concepts can be different only
insofar they have different conceptual roles. I follow Harman (1973) and Block (1986) in
assuming that merely similarity, not necessarily identity in conceptual role is sufficient
to share the same concept. The inferential roles of a term may differ slightly between
persons—people have differing beliefs and endorse different inferences. Individuals
may differ in their mental representations. I view a concept as a cluster of similar
mental representations. Taking a concept as a group-level entity abstracts from this
inter-personal variation and focuses on the more substantial difference between different
concepts. I take two terms to have a different content in case they make inferences or
explanations possible that are relevantly dissimilar. What counts as relevant is depen-
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dent on the scientific standards of the given situation. The concrete scientific situation
determines what counts as giving a justification or an explanation that is different in
kind from other justifications or explanations.5 In what follows, I will present a case
study in which I argue that the term ‘homology’ can be considered as corresponding
to different concepts. These different homology concepts support different kinds of
inferences and explanation, and biologists consider these differences as important— it
matters for biology whether a specific type of explanation can be supported or not by
a particular homology concept.
The point of my claim that there are different homology concepts used is not that
biologists are confused when they just use the term ‘homology’. Instead, biologists may
be aware of the fact that other fields have a different understanding of homology and
use this concept differently. The purpose of my paper is to give a philosophical analysis
of the variation in the term ‘homology’. I intend to show that this variation consist in
differential inferential and explanatory roles, so that different homology concepts yield
different epistemic products. And I make clear how this difference in epistemic products
relates to the theoretical goals of the respective biological disciplines. The upshot of my
argument is that a conceptual role approach gives a good explanation of the variation
of the term under consideration.6
3. Homology in comparative and evolutionary biology. The homology concept
originated in the context of comparative biology, in particular comparative anatomy.
Among current homology concepts the understanding of homology in comparative and
evolutionary biology is the most traditional one. In what follows, I will refer to this
contemporary homology concept by the term phylogenetic homology. In comparative
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anatomy the above mentioned idea of homology as something that refers to the corre-
sponding structures is in this field most clearly employed. In particular bones, organs,
muscles, and tissues are the types of characters that are homologized. The criteria of
homology used are the relative position with respect to other structures, the connec-
tivity to adjacent structures (e.g., blood vessels and nerves), similarity in structural
detail and histology, and correspondence of the developmental origin. Even though the
character distribution on a phylogenetic tree is an additional important criterion for
assessing hypotheses of homology, many of the criteria used for practical work resemble
pre-Darwinian anatomy (Russell 1916). There is a great deal of historical continuity
between the original homology concept and the current phylogenetic homology con-
cept.7
The aim of comparative biology is to compare the characters of different species,
yielding systematic descriptions of large groups of organisms. Homology is a relational
notion used in comparing organisms or species. It identifies characters in different
species that correspond to each other. A homologue behaves and changes as a unit
in development and evolution. The fact that a considered part of an organism can
be homologized with a part in another species is evidence for this part actually being
a unit of the organism, while not sufficiently individualized parts of the body may
lead to dubious or conflicting hypotheses of homology (Wagner 1989b; Wagner and
Gauthier 1999). Homology helps to break organisms down into natural units and it
links these units across species. Homology individuates biological characters. (This is
clearly expressed by the above quoted definition of Owen.) For this reason, identifying
homologues is an important step in comparison and classification. In the case of some
structures, or of more distantly related organisms, it is by no means obvious how to
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homologize structures. Despite large differences between species, homology refers to
common patterns across large groups of organisms.
The crucial type of inferences supported by the homology concept is the follow-
ing: Homologues are derived from a common ancestral structure. For this reason,
properties that hold for a structure in a particular species are likely to hold for the
homologous structure in another species. As phylogenetic homology makes reference
to the common ancestry of homologous structures, the homology concept allows for
inferences from the properties of one type of organism to other organisms. This is im-
portant because individuating biological characters by means of homology allows for
unified descriptions that apply to a relatively large class of organisms. For instance,
neuroanatomical descriptions and theories may just talk about ‘the’ cerebrum, referring
to a class of homologues in a taxa as large as the vertebrates. This is possible because
many morphological, histological, or developmental descriptions of a structure such as
the cerebrum apply to a larger class of organisms. Thus, identifying homologues and
basing comparative descriptions on classes of homologues yields general and unified
morphological knowledge, which is an important epistemic product of comparative bi-
ology. Even before the explicit use of the homology concept, biologists gave the same
name to corresponding structures of different species. In this manner, they followed
a practice that allowed for effective descriptions. Later, once ‘homology’ was clearly
available as a concept, this comparative practice could be made explicit, discussed,
and defended. Having homology as a concept allows for reflection about the nature of
homology and the criteria of homology employed. Biologists make in particular explicit
use of the homology concept when they need to defend their hypothesis of homology,
thereby justifying their naming of structures and comparative descriptions made in
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particular cases. For these reasons, the phylogenetic homology concept is vital for the
types of inferences and their justification made in comparative biology. By establishing
correspondence of structures between different species homology allows for generalized
descriptive knowledge across species.
In addition, apart from providing comparative descriptions of organisms, the com-
parison of characters is necessary to obtain taxonomic classifications of species. Struc-
tures identified as homologous are compared in detail; and their similarities and differ-
ences provide the data for classification. Stable classifications can only be obtained by
comparing corresponding structures in different species. Reference to homology justifies
the fact that certain structures of different species are compared. Thus, phylogenetic
homology serves the goal of comparative biology, producing and justifying general com-
parative descriptions applying to large groups of organisms and providing comparisons
that are effective for classifying species.
In evolutionary biology the focus is on the change of characters in the course of
phylogeny. Homology is a concept that temporally links entities. In accounts of mor-
phological evolution, homologues become historical units that date back to an ancestral
character. Evolutionary approaches to homology are usually so-called transformational
accounts of homology (Hennig 1966; Mayr 1982; Bock 1989; Donoghue 1992), because
an ancestral and descendant character are defined as being homologous in case they
are connected by a transformation series of intermediate homologues (in a lineage of
species leading from the ancestor to the descendant). A main goal of evolutionary
biology is to explain the adaptive modification of traits. The concept of homology is
necessary to conceptualize a lineage of characters. As the process of adaptation oper-
ates over many generations, the corresponding features that are subject to change have
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to be identified. The homologues in a lineage are the entities underlying change. For
instance, in order to talk about the same (type of) selection pressure operating in some
morphological structure over time one needs to identify the lineage of characters on
which this selection pressure operates. Once a lineage of characters has been identified
the transformation of these traits can now be addressed and divergence in splitting
lineages can be studied and explained. Due to different adaptive histories homologues
may be quite dissimilar in shape and function. Identifying homologous structures in
ancestor and descendant is a precondition for giving an adaptation explanation of the
change of these structures. Thus, phylogenetic homology is used to yield (together with
other concepts) an epistemic product of evolutionary biology—describing and explain-
ing the adaptive modification of characters. While homology in comparative biology
allows for inferences, in evolutionary biology it is in addition a conceptual precondition
for explanations by justifying which character transformations need to be studied and
explained. In short, the theoretical role of the phylogenetic homology concept—used in
comparative morphology and evolutionary biology— is to link characters across species
in order to conceptualize the natural units that underlie variation across species or evo-
lutionary change, yielding systematic comparative knowledge and making adaptation
explanations possible.
4. Homology in evolutionary developmental biology. This section is about
developmental approaches to homology, but the understanding of homology described
in this section does actually not apply the developmental biology as a whole. For
instance, the homology concept of many developmental geneticists is the molecular
homology concept described in the next section. This section is about the homology
THE ROLE A CONCEPT PLAYS IN SCIENCE 17
concept of those developmental biologists who take evolutionary as well as theoretical
issues seriously. This is in particular the case for representatives of the discipline of
evolutionary developmental biology.
Developmental homology—as I will call this homology concept— is a quite recent
concept and it is historically derived from phylogenetic homology. Due to the mi-
gration of the older phylogenetic homology concept into a new discipline, the concept
underwent change.8 Biologists both from comparative/evolutionary and developmental
biology largely use the same criteria of homology (Roth 1994), and consider the same
structures of different species as homologous. Nevertheless, the homology concept of
evolutionary developmental biology has a wider extension. Two points are worth men-
tioning. First, developmental biologists apply homology to lower levels of biological
organization than comparative or evolutionary biologists usually do. In developmental
biology, the theoretical focus is on how differentiation takes place and structures are
formed in the course of ontogeny by means of developmental resources such as genes,
cytoplasmic factors, and extracellular signals. Developmental biology studies different
cell types, tissue types, transient structures, and developmental precursors. It is the
branch of biology that addresses most completely all levels of organismic organization
and how they interact. For this reason, when the issue of homology arises conceptually
in the comparison of the development in different organisms, it becomes apparent that
homology exists on different levels of the biological hierarchy. Genes and proteins in
different species can be homologous (when they are derived from a common ancestral
gene or protein). Calling types of cells and tissues the same amounts to an implicit
statement of homology. Due to the explanatory focus of developmental biology, homol-
ogy has to be studied on different levels of biological organization, and thus the concept
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of homology became explicitly applied to different levels.
Second, there is the issue of serial homology. This is the most telling evidence for
the existence of different homology concepts in different biological fields. Sometimes an
organism has a structure or a certain pattern that occurs repeatedly, for instance, hair
in mammals, leafs in plants, the vertebrae in vertebrates, or the segments in metameric
animals. This multiple occurrence of basically the same structure is referred to by the
term serial homology (or also iterative or repetitive homology). This type of homology
was recognized by pre-Darwinian morphology because of their geometrical-topological
approach to homology. (For instance, Owen considered the different vertebrae of an
organism as derived from unique geometric scheme, the ‘ideal vertebra’.) Within an
evolutionary framework, this aspect of homology was largely ignored by accounts in
comparative biology. Obviously the different vertebrae are not derived from an an-
cestor with only one vertebra. In contemporary comparative and evolutionary biology,
serial homology is usually ignored. Sometimes its possibility is denied and the idea of
serial homology is attacked (Ax 1989; Bock 1989; Schmitt 1989). This is due to the
theoretical and explanatory focus of this branch of biology. Comparative biology com-
pares different species (and evolutionary biology deals with lineages of different species).
Important goals of these disciplines are to identify homologues of distinct species and
to compare different species and their characters. Serial homology, however, sets two
parts of the very same organism in correspondence; and this is why it is not impor-
tant for comparative and evolutionary biology. Thus, serial homologues are not part
of the extension of this homology concept. In the case of developmental approaches to
homology, on the other hand, serial homology is widely accepted and utilized (de Beer
1971; van Valen 1982; Wagner 1989a; Minelli and Peruffo 1991; Haszprunar 1992; Roth
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1994; Gilbert, Opitz, and Raff 1996). This is due to the fact that developmental bi-
ology describes and compares processes going on within individuals, trying to account
for the formation of structures in the course of ontogeny. When similar structures are
present several times within an organism, it is natural to ask whether this is due to sim-
ilar development using similar developmental factors and processes. For instance, limb
development is one of the best studied morphogenetic phenomena in land-living verte-
brates. Due to their common topology the front limb and the hind limb are considered
as serial homologues (even though they may look for adaptive reasons quite dissimilar).
Hypotheses take into consideration that repeated patterns might be due to the dupli-
cation of genes or developmental programs, or the use of a the same developmental
resource in different parts of the organism.
While comparative and evolutionary biologists sometimes attack the developmental
homology concept, biologists with a developmental are also aware of these two distinct
understandings of homology (Wagner 1989a; Minelli and Peruffo 1991; Roth 1991; Shu-
bin 1994; Sluys 1996). The discussion already pointed to the fact that this conceptual
difference has something to do with the different theoretical interests and goals of these
fields. Indeed, the conceptual difference goes beyond a difference in extension; the dif-
ference in reference is due to a difference in sense or content. My following account
of the conceptual variation is that it is due to the fact that homology concepts play
different theoretical roles in these two parts of biology. That is, homology concepts are
used to generate different types of biological knowledge or to explain different types of
phenomena. Each homology concept serves the theoretical interests of the field in which
it is used by being a necessary conceptual ingredient in bringing about the epistemic
product characteristic of that field.
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In the case of developmental biology, the epistemic product is explanations of the
formation of structures. Knowledge about developmental processes is generalized by
concepts that refer to commonalities of different concrete developmental mechanisms.
Explanations of the formation of a class of structures are based on considerations about
a corresponding causal origin, a common maintenance, or a comparable developmental
behavior of these structures. Developmental homology refers to repeated or corre-
sponding structures of organisms. This homology concept is used to account for the
similarity of structures within and between organisms by pointing to a (as yet barely
understood) common underlying developmental basis. It focuses on the mechanistic
underpinnings of the structural identity of homologous characters in the course of de-
velopment and evolution. A developmental homology concept is intended to explain
why the same structures (homologues including serial homologues) reliably reappear in
different parts of the organism and in subsequent generations (Wagner 1996), by pick-
ing out structures that participate in similar developmental processes and by referring
to those causal factors and developmental features that account for this reappearance
of structures. In this manner, the developmental homology concept serves one funda-
mental aim of developmental biology—explaining how structures emerge in ontogeny
and why they are how they are (which has a bearing on explaining why structures are
conserved or transformed in the course of phylogeny).
A consequence of the difference in content or theoretical role of the developmental
and phylogenetic homology concept is a difference in reference—developmental ho-
mology applies to a larger domain of characters and to homologues within the same
organism (serial homology). Even if one abstracts from this and considers nothing but
homology among morphological structures in different species (i.e., the extension of
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the phylogenetic homology concept), the different biological branches discussed offer a
different account of why these structures are homologous. Approaches in comparative
and evolutionary biology just refer to inheritance from a common ancestral structure as
the defining feature of homology. For a developmental biologist, reference to common
ancestry (or to the inheritance of genetic information) is non-explanatory, because it
does not give us a causal account of how and why the same morphological structure
are formed in different organism (Wagner 1989b; Roth 1994). Instead, reference to the
developmental processes generating this structures in different organisms is a necessary
part of any developmental approach. The emphasis is on common developmental fea-
tures rather than on common ancestry. For example, the homology definition proposed
by Louise Roth (1984) talks about shared developmental pathways. Gu¨nter Wagner’s
definition of homology, his so-called ‘biological homology concept’, focuses on shared
developmental constraints, but does not make explicit reference to common ancestry
(1989a).
The phylogenetic homology concept has a very limited explanatory potential, its
main role is to yield inferences. Phylogenetic homology— just making reference to com-
mon ancestry—can only account for the taxonomic distribution of characters (Wagner
1994).9 But it cannot fulfill the explanatory tasks of developmental biology; it can-
not explain why the same structure emerges in different places of an organisms or in
different generations. A developmental homology concept—making reference to devel-
opmental processes— is needed to yield these types of explanations. This difference in
conceptual role between phylogenetic and developmental homology justifies the claim
that they are actually two different concepts. Developmental homology supports types
of explanations that phylogenetic homology does not support and these explanations are
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distinct (in fact, developmental) and important explanations. Phylogenetic and de-
velopmental homology serve different epistemic and explanatory goals. Biologists are
aware of the fact that comparative biology is interested in the phylogenetic relation-
ship of species and in grouping organisms into taxa, but that developmental approaches
have different aims (Roth 1991; Wagner 1994; Sluys 1996). Rather than identifying and
comparing homologues, the aim of developmental biology is to explain how structures
emerge in ontogeny and why the same structure develops in the next generation. Since
both disciplines use their homology concept for their theoretical goals, the different
understanding of homology is a matter of meaning rather than of belief. The dispute
of how homology is to be understood or to be defined cannot be settled by standard
empirical findings. For instance, comparative biologists criticize the understanding of
homology in developmental biology, because for them homology is about comparing
different species (Ax 1989), but not about comparing structures within organisms (se-
rial homologues) or explaining the origin of characters. In contrast to homology in
comparative and evolutionary biology, the conceptual role of homology in developmen-
tal biology is to account for the formation of similar structures within and between
organisms and for structural identity in ontogeny and phylogeny.
5. Homology in molecular biology. In molecular biology it is generally genes
and proteins that are homologized. The concept of molecular homology often refers
to the similarity of DNA or amino acid sequences (Hillis 1994; Reeck et al. 1987). In
fact, sometimes it is said that two sequences are 65% homologous, which means that
this percentage of nucleotides is identical in the aligned sequences. Thus molecular
homology is not a all-or-nothing affair, but comes in degrees. Even more important
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is the fact that molecular homology is a statement about the mere similarity of genes
and proteins, but not about their evolutionary origin— inheritance from a common
ancestor. For a more evolutionary understanding that views homology as a concept
referring to the common evolutionary origin of structures, mere sequence similarity is
just a criterion for common ancestry (i.e., homology), but not to be equated with the
concept of homology. Despite some criticisms of the way in which many molecular
biologists use the term ‘homology’, I will focus on the concept of molecular homology
as sequence similarity, because it is the predominant use in molecular biology. This
usage is due to the research scope of many parts of molecular biology. In this field
the focus is on how molecular entities operate and interact; the theoretical goal is to
describe mechanisms and explain phenomena on the molecular level.
A good deal of easily accessible information about the structure as well as the
function of genes and proteins is given by the mere DNA or amino acid sequence.
Discovery in molecular biology depends to a large extent on the search for sequence
correspondence among genes and proteins (and their parts). This is due to the fact
that similar genes have similar genes products and similar proteins are likely to be
part of a similar pathway or to behave similarly in biochemical reactions. Genes and
proteins are grouped into families and classes in the case of high similarity of relevant
parts or domains. Knowing that a protein has a certain functional domain that is
known from other proteins yields information about how it probably behaves in molec-
ular and cellular processes. For instance, proteins with a GPI anchor are known to be
membrane bound, so when a newly studied protein reveals to have such a domain it
is very likely that it is membrane bound, too. To take another well-known example,
all proteins with a homeodomain bind to DNA. Molecular biology often does not deal
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with the comparison of different species or with questions about the classification and
evolution of organisms. Instead, the focus is on the structure of molecular substances
and the mechanisms in which they figure. If the sequence of a new gene or protein is
available, it is compared to known genes and gene products. Molecular homology refers
to the degree of sequence similarity. Similarity allows for an inference or a hypothesis
about the effect or function of a new molecular entity. This provides the opportunity
to examine a new protein more effectively using knowledge about established proteins
and their pathways. The knowledge about certain molecular systems can be employed
to transfer experimental approaches and research strategies to other yet unstudied sys-
tems, provided that both are known to be similar. Often the similarity-based inference
from one system to a new one yields effective ways of discovery rather than a direct
confirmation of the properties of the new system.
In molecular biology, the research focus is on the experimental level. The goal of this
discipline is to discover mechanisms, which is crucial for explanations on the molecular
level and basis for technological manipulation. For this reason, an operational account
of homology is important. Molecular homology as mere similarity of DNA or amino acid
sequence is an understanding of homology that is tied to the experimental approach of
molecular biology. It is effective to organize knowledge about the structure and function
of molecular substances and to direct experimental practice. The conceptual role of
molecular homology is to infer theoretical hypothesis and experimental strategies about
molecular entities and mechanisms. Molecular homology is an operational concept that
is theoretically not as robust as phylogenetic or developmental homology. The fact
that two gene sequences are similar is not to be equated with the fact that they are
derived from a common ancestral gene. A collection of similar genes is not a lineage
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of characters to which phylogenetic homology refers. Structural similarity refers to a
pattern, but does not include the ontogenetic or phylogenetic processes that brought
about the similarity. For this reason, the molecular homology concept is not able to
support the phylogenetic inferences and developmental explanations that the homology
concepts of evolutionary and evolutionary developmental biology support.10
6. Conclusion. I have argued that the term ‘homology’ actually corresponds to
different concepts. My account of homology as an investigative kind concept pointed
to the common root of these homology concepts. These different concepts are referred
to by the same term because they are historically descended from one concept and they
are similar in certain respects. Across biological fields homology is assumed to designate
corresponding characters in different organisms, and the same criteria of homology are
used. The idea of an investigative kind concept also allows for an explanation of why
there are different accounts of largely the same objects that are grouped together as
homologues.
The focus of the present discussion was on the current conceptual variation in the
term ‘homology’. My conceptual role approach suggests searching for conceptual dif-
ferences by studying the different theoretical roles of concepts. The variation in the
case of homology is actually grouped around distinct poles that correspond to different
biological fields. I explained this variation with reference to the different epistemic in-
terests and theoretical goals of particular biological fields. Homology concepts are used
to obtain characteristic types of inferences and explanations. In the case of comparative
and evolutionary biology, the goals are the comparison and taxonomy of species and
the explanation of descent with modification. The theoretical role of homology in com-
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parative morphology and evolutionary biology is the individuation of characters across
species and the conceptualization of a lineage of species characters despite variation and
potentially unlimited evolutionary change. This allows for unified knowledge about the
structure of large groups of organisms in the case of comparative biology, and is a pre-
condition for explaining adaptation in the case of evolutionary biology. In evolutionary
developmental biology the goal is to figure out how and why certain structures emerge
in ontogeny. The conceptual role of developmental homology is to explain the forma-
tion of similar structures within and between organisms and to account for structural
identity in ontogeny and phylogeny. Finally, in molecular biology the epistemic aim is
the description of molecular mechanisms and the explanation of molecular phenomena.
The role of molecular homology is the inference of information about the molecular
behavior of genes and proteins (and their parts), particularly in order to guide further
experimental investigation and technological manipulation.
Conceptual differences of a term have been subject to philosophical investigation.
While many former accounts of conceptual change focused on the reference of concepts,
studying differences in extension alone may in some cases be of limited value. Con-
ceptual roles cut sometimes finer than extension—concepts with the same extension
may have a different content. We saw that the conceptual variation in the homology
concept goes beyond mere difference of reference. The phylogenetic and developmental
homology concepts differ in their explanatory potential. Conceptual roles not only offer
a more fine-grained analysis than the study of extension, they also explain why there
is a difference in content and possibly in extension. Biologist sometimes criticize the
homology concept of another field because the rival concept does not do the (in their
view) right theoretical job. A philosophical account should not just determine possible
THE ROLE A CONCEPT PLAYS IN SCIENCE 27
differences of extension among homology concepts, but it should have a grasp on the
reasons for adopting or criticizing particular homology concepts. The discussion tried
to explain how the variation in the homology concept came about by the different the-
oretical demands of biological fields. Former approaches to conceptual change usually
attempted to rebut the incommensurability threat and thus focused on reference. My
approach, instead, is primarily concerned with explaining conceptual change, using an
account of concepts that captures the way in which concepts figure in reasoning and
are used to pursue explanatory goals.
My philosophical frameworks allows for evaluating whether an instance of concep-
tual change is an advance by studying the types of knowledge that are produced by
concepts. The inferences supported by the phylogenetic homology concept are the ba-
sis of an effective comparative practice in biology, which is of fundamental importance
because it individuates characters across large groups of organisms. Molecular homol-
ogy is an effective conceptual tool given the focus on discovery in this field. Biologists
with a developmental approach to evolution are trying to develop a developmental ho-
mology concept that has an explanatory potential that goes fundamentally beyond the
phylogenetic homology concept. Currently developmental homology has still a lim-
ited explanatory potential and it remains to be seen whether empirical and theoretical
progress will bring about a substantial improvement on phylogenetic homology.
I believe that my framework could be applied to other instances of conceptual
change such as the transition from the Mendelian to the molecular gene concept or
the emergence of various species concepts. Several authors have argued for or against
pluralism about the species concept. My discussion of homology suggests a pluralist
approach insofar as I view the emergence of different homology concept as rational
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and progressive given the demands of particular fields. An implication for biological
practice is that the debate between different fields about the right understanding of
‘the’ homology concept is of limited use. The different homology concepts can coexist
because each is an effective tool for certain purposes. A biologist can simply stick to
the homology concept used by her field—as long as it is explicitly recognized that
there are other homology concepts that satisfy different theoretical needs. This upshot
is not to be construed as the idea that the current situation has to persist. I do not
claim that biology must necessarily have three or more homology concepts or that none
of the current homology concepts might disappear in the future. Some might want
to argue that a successful future developmental homology concept could encompass
a phylogenetic homology concept, or that we should not use the term ‘homology’ for
an operational concept such as the molecular homology concept. In contrast to past
discussions about species pluralism, my focus was more on the rational explanation of
conceptual diversity rather than its ultimate justification. My approach is also different
from some former discussions of pluralism in that former accounts often simply assumed
that different species definitions amount to different concepts. My discussion explicitly
used a theory of conceptual content so that I have a better basis for justifying the claim
that we actually deal with different concepts.
I used a conceptual role semantics approach as a heuristic device for the study of
conceptual variation. My approach suggested pinning down potential differences in the
content of the term ‘homology’ by looking at the theoretical role of this concept—
the types of inferences and explanations that a particular homology concept makes
possible. This account has the advantage that it links the individuation of concepts
with the epistemic product and theoretical goals of particular scientific fields or research
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approaches, which in turn makes intelligible why a particular concept is used in a specific
field. The approach also allows to evaluate whether conceptual change is progressive by
studying the change in the inferential and explanatory potential of concepts and their
significance. My discussion of the homology concept suggests that a conceptual role
semantics approach might be a fruitful approach for the study of conceptual change
and variation of other scientific concepts.
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Notes
1For discussions of the history of homology see Russell (1916), Panchen (1994), and
Laubichler (2000).
2This idea of an investigative kind is similar to Boyd’s (1999) concept of a natural
kind. My notion of a investigative kind concept stresses the research attitude taken by
scientists and the fact that a scientific search may have an unexpected outcome such
as the emergence of new homology concepts.
3More precisely, inference is a relationship between sentences or propositions. The
inferential role of a concept is the class of inferences between propositions that this
concept makes possible by virtue of being part of some of these propositions (Block
1986; Brandom 1994). Some authors that endorse conceptual role semantics have done
this based on their commitment to functionalism. The notion of interferential role I
employ is general enough so that I need not endorse a particular theory of the mind.
4Conceptual roles are often associated with narrow (as opposed to wide) content,
i.e., the relationship between the mind and the world is not part of the conceptual role.
It has been argued that versions of conceptual role semantics focusing on inferential
role or narrow content alone cannot give a satisfactory account of content, because they
cannot account for the representational aspects of content, and thus for the possibility
of misrepresentation and falsehood. Proponents of conceptual role semantics have re-
acted to this problem by including the mind-world relationship in the conceptual role
(Harman 1987), or by saying that inferential role/narrow content is only one aspect
of content to by supplied by an account of reference (Field 1977; McGinn 1982; Block
1986). I favor this second option, but since my goal is to study differences in certain
scientific concepts rather than putting forward a general theory of content I am not
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concerned with this issue in the present paper.
5What counts as a relevant difference may also be dependent on the explanatory
interests of the person ascribing concepts— in this context the philosopher of science
studying conceptual change. The present analysis of the homology concept is primarily
concerned with explaining conceptual change. My way of picking out certain clusters
of similar conceptual roles as different concepts is fruitful because I can explain the
emergence of these different concepts by reference to the theoretical goals of different
fields.
6Some parts of the case study stem from a biological manuscript on the homology
concept.
7The continuity is so large that I am inclined to assume that the advent of Dar-
winism did not create a new and distinct homology concept. The current phylogenetic
homology concept is still used for largely the same purposes and in the same way. But
assessing this difficult issue is not subject of the present discussion.
8Homology was approached from the point of view of development from the very
beginning of its pre-Darwinian origin (e.g., in the form of the embryological criterion).
But in my view these developmental considerations probably did not amount to a
distinct concept. The recent concept of developmental homology is a distinct concept
because it is used for different explanatory purposes.
9As we saw in the case of evolutionary biology, phylogenetic homology is a concep-
tual precondition that makes adaptation explanations possible. Homology refers to the
entities that undergo evolutionary change, but by itself it does not explain the change.
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10To be sure, in branches of molecular biology that are not so much oriented to-
wards biomedical applications but deal with molecular evolution or molecular phylogeny
things are different. Here it is important to know whether two genes actually have the
same evolutionary origin—whether they are actually the same ones. For this rea-
son, the understanding of molecular homology as mere sequence similarity has been
criticized by several molecular biologists (see, e.g., Reeck et al. 1987). In molecular
evolution the focus is on how genes evolve and how they are related. The question of
sequence similarity due to common ancestry (homology) or due to convergence (anal-
ogy) has to be addressed. Such a homology concept does not refer to mere similarity
of genes and proteins, but also to the explanation of this resemblance. This homology
concept as used in molecular phylogeny and evolution is theoretically more robust and
more like the application of phylogenetic homology to the molecular level.
